Ohio

CASES
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  • Eastlake v. Komes, Slip Copy (2010)
    After driver was found not guilty of operating a motor vehicle under the influence, driver sought to reverse administrative license suspension. The Willoughby Municipal Court, No. 09 TRC 00211, terminated the suspension. City appealed. The Court of Appeals, Lake County, held that driver was not informed of the consequences of refusing breath test, and was entitled to termination of administrative license suspension. Affirmed.
  • In re D.E., Not Reported in N.E.2d (2010)
    Juvenile court abused its discretion by imposing a 90-year suspension on the ability of a juvenile, adjudicated delinquent for committing acts consisting of the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide, to apply for a driver's license. While the aggravated vehicular homicide statute contained a provision for license suspensions to include a lifetime suspension, the juvenile code provided no indication that the limited jurisdiction of the juvenile court was extended for the purpose of imposing a lifetime suspension. R.C. 2152.01(C)(6).
  • Parma v. Benedict, Slip Copy (2013)
    Appellant appealed from his conviction in the Parma Municipal Court for operating a vehicle while intoxicated ("OVI"). He argued that the trial court impermissibly applied provisions of the law that had changed from the time of his criminal conduct to the time of his sentence. He also argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and law, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence.
  • State v. Allen, Slip Copy (2010)
    A police officer's failure to notarize an administrative license suspension (ALS) form as required by state law did not render the suspension invalid. The police officer pulled over a defendant, administered a series of field sobriety tests, and administered a chemical test. After the test revealed that the defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was .204%, the police officer advised her that her license was suspended and gave the defendant an unsworn copy of the ALS form. The police officer failed to notarize the ALS form before submitting it to the Registrar and trial court. However the form and the state law on which it was based specifically stated that if found to be at or over the prohibited amount of alcohol a person's driving privileges would be suspended immediately, indicating that the defendant's driving privileges were suspended the moment the chemical test revealed a BAC of .204%. R.C. 4511.197(C).
  • State v. Arrazzaq, Slip Copy (2012)
    After his motion to suppress was denied, defendant-appellant Ulema Arrazzaq pleaded no contest to trafficking in cocaine, possession of cocaine, carrying a concealed weapon, and having a weapon while under a disability. Both drug offenses carried firearm specifications. In one assignment of error, he claimed that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress. While the Court of Appeals disagreed with Arrazzaq's position on the motion to suppress, an error in his sentence required them to vacate his sentence in part and remand the case for correction of the sentencing error.
  • State v. Benjamin, Slip Copy (2011)
    Akie H. Benjamin appealed the trial court's denial of his Motion to Vacate Void Sentence Pursuant to R.C. 2953.08(A)(4). Benjamin contended that his sentence was void because the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated driver's license suspension, and thus, he was entitled to a resentencing hearing. Because the trial court failed to impose a statutorily mandated driver's license suspension, Benjamin's sentence is void, and the trial court must resentence Benjamin. However, the Court of Appeals limited Benjamin's resentencing hearing to the proper imposition of the statutorily mandated driver's license suspension.
  • State v. Boafor, Slip Copy (2013)
    Defendant-appellant Timothy Boafor appealed from the judgment of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which imposed a ninety-day license suspension after accepting a no contest plea to speeding at a rate of 77 mph in a 65 mph zone. First, appellant argued that a license suspension could not be imposed under R.C 4510.15 because this speeding charge could not be categorized as "relating to reckless operation." Second, appellant contended that he could only be convicted of a minor misdemeanor because the traffic ticket did not charge a third degree misdemeanor or mention predicate offenses. For the following reasons, the Court of Appeals concluded that both arguments had merit. Appellant's license suspension was vacated and his speeding conviction was to be modified to reflect only a minor misdemeanor.
  • State v. Brabant, Slip Copy (2011)
    Trial court did not err in denying a driver's appeal from an administrative license suspension for refusing a requested chemical breath test subsequent to his arrest for operating a vehicle under the influence. There was sufficient circumstantial evidence that the driver was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the crash, despite the driver's claim that he consumed alcohol after the crash. The abundant inconsistencies in the driver's story, coupled with the arresting officer's training and experience, provided the officer, who made the arrest at the driver's home after the driver left the scene, with reasonable grounds to believe the driver had violated the statute prohibiting driving under the influence. R.C. §§ 4511.19, 4511.197(A).
  • State v. Eaton, Slip Copy (2010)
    A defendant's refusal to take a chemical test following his arrest on suspicion of operating a vehicle while intoxicated was not involuntary. Defendant, who was driving a commercial vehicle at the time of his arrest, was asked to submit to a chemical test and informed in a recorded conversation that if he refused to submit, his license would be automatically suspended. The officer informed defendant that the legal limit for commercial drivers was .02 when it was actually .04, but still informed defendant as to the consequences of his refusal. The officer specifically informed the defendant of regulations applicable to commercial drivers, and asked defendant to follow along. The officer informed defendant that he could not help him make the decision, and that the defendant would have to decide on his own. R.C. § 4506.15(A)(2).
  • State v. Gant, Slip Copy (2013)
    This is an appeal from a judgment of the Maumee Municipal Court, which found appellant guilty of reckless operation. Appellant was clocked on radar by the Ohio State Highway Patrol traveling at 94 m.p.h. in a 70 m.p.h. zone on the Ohio Turnpike in Lucas County, Ohio. At sentencing, the trial court suspended appellant's driver's license for a period of sixty days, and imposed a fine and court costs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.
  • State v. Haralson, Slip Copy (2013)
    Plaintiff-appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals from the Warren County Court of Common Pleas decision terminating the driver's license suspension of defendant-appellee, Tyrone Haralson, following Haralson's conviction for trafficking in marijuana. Reversed and remanded.
  • State v. Henry, 191 Ohio App.3d 151 (2010)
    IMPLIED CONSENT Defendant was convicted in the Bowling Green Municipal Court, No. 09TRC04543, of operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol content. He appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] police officer's failure to retain slip from instrument check on breath testing machine did not warrant suppression of blood-alcohol test results from machine; [2] arresting officer's failure to warn defendant of the consequences of refusing an alcohol test or of an unlawful result upon defendant's commercial driver's license (CDL) did not warrant suppression of test results; and [3] results of blood-alcohol test performed using portable breath testing machine were admissible. Affirmed.
  • State v. Hutchings, Slip Copy (2013)
    Defendant-appellant, Mark R. Hutchings, appealed from the trial court's journal entry of sentencing, which included the suspension of his Michigan driver's license. Affirmed and remanded.
  • State v. Jenkins, Slip Copy (2010)
    A police officer had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a defendant was driving under a suspended license and was not within his limited driving privileges to conduct a traffic stop. Therefore the defendant was not entitled to suppress evidence related to the traffic stop. The officer observed the defendant speeding and was subsequently informed by dispatch that the defendant had limited driving privileges and was driving away from his home. OH Const. Art. 1, § 14; R.C. 4510.11.
  • State v. Knowlton, 971 N.E.2d 395 (2012)
    Defendant was convicted in the Marietta Municipal Court of operating a motor vehicle while impaired, failure to control, and failure to stop after an accident involving the property of others. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] evidence was sufficient to support conviction for failure to stop; [2] the trial court was not authorized to suspend defendant's driver's license as part of his failure to stop conviction; and [3] counsel's failure to make additional arguments in support of acquittal of the failure to stop charge did not prejudice defendant. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

 

  • State v. Ledley, Slip Copy (2010)
    Trial court abused its discretion when it suspended driver's driver's license after driver pled guilty to a violation under a statute that did not give the court the authority to suspend a driver's license. Driver was driving along a wet roadway when she failed to stop at a stop sign at the intersection and "clipped" a street sign, damaging it.
  • State v. Lewis, 187 Ohio App.3d 701 (2010)
    Motorist was charged with driving under influence (OVI), making improper turn, and failing to reinstate license. The Municipal Court, No. 09TRC-21296A, entered guilty verdict on traffic offenses, and not guilty verdict on OVI charge, and terminated administrative license suspension that was imposed following motorist's refusal to submit to chemical test. City appealed. The Court of Appeals, Hamilton County, held that not guilty verdict on charge for OVI did not permit termination of automatic administrative suspension of motorist's driver's license for having refused to submit to chemical test. Reversed and remanded.
  • State v. Manocchio, 138 Ohio St.3d 292 (2014)
    Motorist whose driver's license was subject to lifetime suspension filed motion for limited driving privileges. The Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, No. CR-435289, granted the motion, and state appealed. The Court of Appeals, 2012 WL 6061380, affirmed. State filed discretionary appeal. The Supreme Court held that: [1] granting of limited driving privileges was not a "modification" of the suspension, but [2] trial court was required to specify a purpose and place for the driving privileges. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
  • State v. McElfresh, Slip Copy (2012)
  • State v. McPhillamy, Slip Copy (2012)
    Defendant-appellant, Brad McPhillamy, appeals the July 5, 2011 judgment of the Erie County Municipal Court which denied his request for an administrative license suspension hearing. The Court of Appeals found that the request was untimely. Affirmed.
  • State v. Ritchie, Slip Copy (2011)
    Defendant's sentence of eight years in prison and suspended driving privileges for ten years starting after the prison term ended for his conviction of aggravated vehicular homicide was not unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Although defendant's punishment would span eighteen years and the maximum prison term was eight years, the court was also required to impose a suspension of defendant's driver's license from anywhere from three years to life. Moreover, nothing in the Sentencing Guidelines prohibited the court from requiring the suspension to be served consecutive to the prison term. R.C. §§ 2929.14(A)(2), 2903.06(B)(3).
  • State v. Sheppeard, Slip Copy (2013)
    Defendant appealed from his conviction of operating a vehicle under the influence of drugs or alcohol ("OVI") and failure to stop after an accident, both first-degree misdemeanors, claiming that his conviction was based on insufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress, that the court erred in "changing its ALS [administrative license suspension] appeal ruling," and that his sentences were excessive and constituted a punishment for exercising his right to a jury trial. Affirmed.
  • State v. Starkey, 985 N.E.2d 295 (2012)
    IMPLIED CONSENT Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). The Municipal Court, Portage County, Ravenna Division, No. R2011 TRC 16356, granted defendant's motion to suppress results of urine test that had been conducted at scene of fatal accident involving defendant's commercial vehicle. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Portage County, held that: [1] police officers conducted test in violation of implied consent law; but [2] statutory violation did not require suppression of test results; and [3] trial court was required to determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to test. Reversed and remanded.
  • State v. Tweddell, Slip Copy (2010)
    Defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated (OVI). The Municipal Court, Portage County, Ravenna Division, No. R2011 TRC 16356, granted defendant's motion to suppress results of urine test that had been conducted at scene of fatal accident involving defendant's commercial vehicle. State appealed. The Court of Appeals, Portage County, held that: [1] police officers conducted test in violation of implied consent law; but [2] statutory violation did not require suppression of test results; and [3] trial court was required to determine whether defendant voluntarily consented to test. Reversed and remanded.
  • State v. Vascik, Slip Copy (2011)
    Trial court did not improperly sentence defendant convicted of driving while intoxicated when it suspended her operator's license for 365 days and ordered to display restricted yellow license plates and have an ignition interlock device installed on her vehicle as a condition of obtaining limited driving privileges during the term of her suspension. Defendant argued that she was a school teacher with no previous alcohol-related offenses, or any other traffic violations, and no criminal record. She argued that it was unfair to add penalties to her sentence for not submitting to a blood alcohol test. But defendant's sentence was within statutorily prescribed limits, and the record did not include a transcript of defendant's sentencing hearing. R.C. §§ 4511.19(A)(1)(a), 4510.02(A) (5), 4510.021(A), 4510.021(C).
  • Westlake v. Gerber, Slip Copy (2011)
    Trial court erred in finding that a driver's refusal to take an alcohol test triggered an administrative license suspension when a police officer had no reasonable articulable suspension to pull the driver's car over. Police officer claimed that he pulled driver over for weaving in his lane. However, review of video from the police officer's dashboard camera revealed that the defendant was not weaving and the police officer did not have reasonable suspicion to pull the driver over. Because the trial court concluded that the stop was unlawful, the request that the driver submit to chemical testing and the suspension of his driver's license for refusal to do so was likewise unlawful.
STATUTES

Adoption of Federal Regulations

  • No reference.

What Constitutes a CMV

Major Disqualifying Offenses

Major Disqualifying Offenses (Alcohol)

Serious Traffic Offenses

Identification of Conviction

Masking Convictions

  • No reference.

10-Day Posting Requirement

Other CDL Provisions