Texas

CASES
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  • Hassan v. State, --- S.W.3d ---- (2012)
    Defendant was convicted in the municipal court of failing to stop at a clearly marked stop line when facing a red light. Defendant appealed. The County Criminal Court at Law No. 14, Harris County, affirmed. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 346 S.W.3d 234, reversed and remanded. State petitioned for review. The Court of Criminal Appeals, 369 S.W.3d 872, reversed and remanded. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that: [1] trial court's question to defendant did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination; [2] trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for deferred disposition probation; and [3] trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony of police officers that defendant was not directed by a traffic device to turn left on the red light. Affirmed.
  • Montgomery v. State, 346 S.W.3d 747 (2011)
    Defendant was convicted in the 337th District Court, Harris County of criminally negligent homicide, and was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence was legally insufficient to support finding of requisite culpable mental state to support conviction. Reversed and rendered.
  • Omega Contracting, Inc. v. Torres, 191 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006)
    Driver of tractor-trailer, who was injured when tires separated from oncoming tractor-trailer and precipitated wreck involving four tractor-trailer rigs, belonged to the class that Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), prohibiting operation of vehicles with missing nuts or bolts and requiring a motor carrier to maintain motor vehicles in safe and proper operating conditions and a driver to be satisfied that vehicle was in safe operating condition, were intended to protect, and his injury was of a type that the regulations were designed to prevent, for purposes of determining whether injured driver had a negligence per se claim based on such regulations against owner and driver of oncoming tractor-trailer.
  • State v. Hollis, 327 S.W.3d 750 (2010)
    Defendant pled guilty in justice court to driving 72 miles per hour in a 55-mile per-hour zone, and the County Court at Law No. 2, Brazos County, deferred finding of guilt and ordered defendant to complete a driving safety course. State appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: [1] statute providing, in certain circumstances, for deferred adjudication of guilt authorizes county court to grant deferred adjudication on appeal to a defendant who did not invoke procedures providing for driving safety courses in relation to offense at justice court level and who did not commit a serious traffic violation while driving a commercial motor vehicle, and [2] county court could grant deferred adjudication and order completion of driving safety course on defendant's appeal. Affirmed.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Caruana, 363 S.W.3d 558 (2012)
    Department of Public Safety appealed from order of the County Court at Law No. 1, Hays County, reversing administrative suspension of driver's license of motorist arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Austin Court of Appeals, 363 S.W.3d 606, affirmed. Department petitioned for review. The Supreme Court granted petition, and held that officer's failure to swear to arrest report did not deprive it of assurance of veracity or render it inadmissible. Reversed and remanded.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Castro, 406 S.W.3d 782 (2013)
    After the Department of Public Safety suspended licensee's driver's license, he appealed. An administrative law judge affirmed the suspension. Licensee appealed. The County Court at Law Number Five of El Paso County, reversed. The Department appealed. The Court of Appeals held that police officer had reasonable suspicion to lawfully detain defendant. Reversed and rendered.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Cerda, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2011)
    Driver did not exhaust mandatory administrative remedies in his attempt to have his driver's license restored, and trial court therefore did not have subject matter jurisdiction to grant driver a temporary injunction ordering the Department of Public Safety to restore his license. Driver had been arrested for driving while intoxicated, and his driver's license had been suspended for failure to take a breath test. The case was later dismissed due to insufficient evidence.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Garza, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2010)
    Substantial evidence supported an ALJ's suspension of a driver's license. A police officer had a reasonable suspicion to stop the driver because he committed a traffic violation and there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the stop. The defendant smelled of alcohol, admitted to drinking four or five 12-ounce beers earlier that evening, performed poorly on the administered field-sobriety tests, and failed a breath test.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Gasper, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2013)
    Appellant, the Texas Department of Public Safety, appeals the trial court's reversal of an administrative law judge's decision that permitted DPS to suspend appellee's driver's license based on his refusal to provide a breath specimen following his arrest for driving while intoxicated. Court of Appeals of Texas, Corpus Christi-Edinburg, reversed the trial court's judgment and rendered judgment reinstating the administrative order.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Greathouse, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2011)
    IMPLIED CONSENT Motorist's speed before being stopped by police officer, his lack of balance and leaning on his vehicle for support, his inability to promptly answer questions posed to him, his refusal to comply with the officer's requests to perform field sobriety testing or to provide a breath or blood specimen, and his admission of ingesting prescription medication was sufficient grounds to establish probable cause that motorist was driving while intoxicated as a result of the introduction of a drug into his body. Thus, under the implied consent statute, the suspension of motorist's driving privileges for two years was warranted for his refusal to submit to giving a breath or blood specimen after his arrest for driving while intoxicated.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Guajardo, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2010)
    An ALJ's decision to uphold a driver's license suspension was supported by substantial evidence. The evidence indicated that a police officer had probable cause to stop the driver, the driver performed poorly on field sobriety tests and subsequently refused the officer's request to submit to a breath test.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Henson, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2010)
    A trooper's failure to complete a refusal report after a driver refused to submit to an alcohol concentration test did not invalidate the suspension of the driver's license. The driver, a minor, was stopped for a traffic violation. During the stop, the officer observed a strong odor of alcohol and conducted three field sobriety tests. The driver performed poorly on the sobriety tests and after being given the statutorily required warning, refused to submit to an alcohol concentration test. Although the trooper failed to complete a refusal report, the completion of the report was not a prerequisite for suspension.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Jackson, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2013)
    Texas Department of Public Safety appealed from a judgment rendered in favor of appellee on a petition for judicial review of the administrative suspension of his driver's license. Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.), affirmed.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Kaspar, 369 S.W.3d 172 (2012)
    Luke Thomas Kaspar was arrested for driving while intoxicated and provided a breath specimen with an alcohol concentration of 0.188 to 0.199, more than twice the legal limit of 0.08. An administrative law judge sustained the Texas Department of Public Safety's suspension of Kaspar's driver's license, based on the arresting officer's report and the Breath Test Technical Supervisor Affidavit. Kaspar objected to the admission of the report because it was unsworn and to the admission of the test because neither the breath test technical supervisor nor breath test operator was present as requested. Kaspar did not subpoena the officer. The county court affirmed the suspension, but the court of appeals reversed and rendered. Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Potter, Not Reported in S.W.3d (2010)
    Substantial evidence supported the decision of an Administrative Law Judge suspending a driver's license for 180 days, finding that a state trooper had probable cause to believe that a licensee who refused to provide a blood or breath specimen was driving while intoxicated. The evidence showed that licensee was uncontrollably crying, had emotional outbursts, had glassy, red eyes, and that her breath smelled strongly of alcohol. A trial court upon appeal erred in relying on licensee's contention that the Department of Public Safety failed to prove a temporal link between licensee's driving and her intoxication.
  • Texas Dept. of Public Safety v. Schleisner, 343 S.W.3d 292 (2011)
    Motorist appealed an administrative suspension of his driver's license based on a refusal to take a breath test after he was arrested for driving while intoxicated. After a hearing with the Department of Public Safety (DPS), an administrative law judge upheld the suspension. Motorist filed a petition of appeal. The County Court at Law No. 3, Galveston County, granted the petition and reversed the suspension. DPS appealed. The Court of Appeals held that evidence was sufficient for ALJ to conclude that motorist refused to provide a breath specimen for alcohol testing. Reversed and rendered.
  • Wood v. Texas Dept. of Public Safety, 331 S.W.3d 78 (2010)
    Motorist applied to renew his driver's license, but was denied because he owed $8,580.00 in surcharges under the Driver Responsibility Program. Motorist then petitioned for an occupational license, claiming that his license was suspended for his failure to pay the surcharges and that he had essential need for transportation to and from work. The County Court at Law No. 2, Tarrant County, denied motorist's petition for an occupational license, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals held that motorist should not have been denied occupational driver's license based on his failure to pay surcharges under the Driver Responsibility Program. Reversed and remanded.
STATUTES

Adoption of Federal Regulations

What Constitutes a CMV

Major Disqualifying Offenses

Major Disqualifying Offenses (Alcohol)

Serious Traffic Offenses

Identification of Conviction

Masking Convictions

  • No reference.

10-Day Posting Requirement

Other CDL Provisions