Appellants alleged negligence and requested punitive damages for alleged violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR). On appeal, appellants argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding evidence of appellees’ failure to comply with the FMCSR for post-accident-testing for controlled substances. The circuit court excluded evidence of appellees’ failure to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements based on its finding that the evidence was not the type of conduct in which malice could be inferred. The reviewing court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence that appellees failed to comply with the post-accident-testing requirements of the FMCSR. The alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. § 382.303 occurred after the accident and there was no indication that the violations contributed to or caused the accident. Also, the alleged violations did not support a punitive-damages award. There was no evidence that the driver had been drinking alcohol or using controlled substances prior to the accident or that he was under the influence of alcohol or any controlled substances at the time of the accident.
Driver was arrested for DWI in another state. The charge was nolle prossed, and an administrative hearing was held, which resulted in the suspension of his driving privileges. The driver argued that the suspension of his driver’s license was not a conviction for DWI that warranted disqualification. He claimed that the administrative findings were not a conviction under Arkansas law and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations only required a one-year suspension when a person was convicted of a DWI as defined by state law. The court found that Arkansas had adopted the federal regulations. The administrative tribunal’s ruling was a conviction as defined by 49 C.F.R. § 383.5. Under 49 C.F.R. § 384.206, once the DFA received adverse information about the driver and found no action had been taken as a result, it was required to implement the disqualification. The circuit court did not err in affirming the DFA’s disqualification of the driver.
Tests used to determine the alcohol content of blood must be carefully monitored to assure reliability. Tallant v. State, 42 Ark. App. 150, 856 S.W.2d 24 (1993). But a showing of substantial compliance with health department regulations is sufficient. Goode v. State, 303 Ark. 609, 798 S.W.2d 430 (1990). Substantial compliance found here—accordingly, suspension of commercial driver’s license for one year upheld.
Court rejects driver’s contention that his commercial driver’s license should have been reinstated following his acquittal for DUI and conviction for having refused to submit to a chemical test of his blood/breath where driver had failed (1) to submit a rehabilitation certificate, (2) to submit an SR-22 form, demonstrating proof of liability insurance, and (3) failed to re-test for a CDL—reinstatement was not required until all such steps had been taken.
Defendant who entered conditional guilty plea (to charge of DUI while holding a commercial driver’s license) conditioned on his right to appeal trial court’s adverse ruling on his pretrial motion to suppress could not on appeal raise challenge to sufficiency of evidence or factual basis for his plea.Citizen-informant’s tip that he had observed elderly male in red tractor-trailer drinking beer in cab of his vehicle in commercial truck parking lot behind restaurant gave officer reasonable suspicion to order defendant out of that vehicle, even though information was provided over phone, and even though police had no prior dealings with informant; informant identified himself by name, address, and occupation, thus exposing himself to potential prosecution for making false report, informant personally observed alleged criminal activity, and officer’s own observations substantially corroborated informant’s report. Citizen-informant’s tip gave officer reasonable suspicion to order defendant out of his truck.
Court upholds service of process by publication (and suspension of Plaintiff’s commercial driver’s license) as a practical, but imperfect means of giving notice to Plaintiff—finding that this process satisfied due process. Suspension upheld where Plaintiff’s contract with PCIDC provided for suspension of his CDL if he failed to pay for his CDL school.NOTE: Rule 4(f) was amended by the Arkansas Supreme Court on January 24, 2002. See In re: Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure; and Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, 347 Ark. Appx. (2002).
Statute that required driver to surrender license upon arrest for driving while intoxicated, and establishing procedure to contest suspension, was not unconstitutional as applied under due process clause, where hearing officer considered not only sworn reports of police officers, but also letter from driver’s physician explaining he was taking prescription pain killers, in upholding the suspension, and both administrative hearing and de novo hearing were held well within statutory time frame.
Court upholds suspension of CDL for one year and suspension of non-commercial license for six months, holding that motorist’s refusal to submit to a chemical test was a reason to suspend his driving privileges, and that motorist was properly informed that his driving privileges would be revoked or disqualified if he refused to submit to a chemical test—rejecting motorist’s challenge to the wording of the warnings given to him.
Court upholds conviction for possession of controlled substances with intent to deliver that was based on constructive possession where controlled substances were found in an automobile that was owned by another person but was being carried on an automobile carrier operated by defendant.
There was sufficient evidence adduced at trial that presented additional factors linking defendant to controlled substances that were found in an automobile, which belonged to another person, that defendant was transporting on an automobile carrier for the jury to conclude that defendant constructively possessed controlled substances, without resorting to speculation or conjecture, to support defendant’s conviction for possession of controlled substances with purpose to deliver; evidence indicated that bills of lading for automobiles on carrier were not filled out properly, defendant acted nervously and spontaneously brought up controlled substances when asked if he allowed people to keep items in automobiles, and automobile contained a substantial amount of controlled substances.
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