Trent Guthmiller appeals from a district court judgment affirming a North Dakota Department of Transportation (“DOT”) decision disqualifying his commercial driving privileges for 60 days. Guthmiller argues the DOT misapplied the law in its application of N.D.C.C. § 39–06.2–10(15) by disqualifying his commercial driving privileges based on the commission of two serious traffic violations within three years rather than the conviction of two serious traffic violations within three years. This Court reversed the decision. This Court reviews administrative agency decisions to suspend driving privileges under N.D.C.C. ch. 28–32 and accords great deference to the agency’s decision. Hamre v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2014 ND 23, ¶ 5, 842 N.W.2d 865. Although the DOT argued that the legislature adopted the statute to comply with a federal act, this Court concluded that N.D.C.C. § 39–06.2–10(15) is free of all ambiguity. This Court held that the statute is unambiguous, and that this Court may not disregard the letter of the law to pursue its spirit. It is the legislature’s decision whether the conviction or the commission of a violation triggers the three-year time period for disqualification. Therefore, this Court held that the DOT’s decision disqualifying Guthmiller’s commercial driving privileges for 60 days was not in accordance with the law. Ultimately, this Court reversed the district court’s judgment and reinstated Guthmiller’s commercial driving privileges because the statute unambiguously requires two convictions within three years.
Kyle Christianson appeals from a district court’s judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges. Christianson asserts the Department’s hearing file, which was admitted at the adjudication hearing, was improperly certified as a true copy of the Department’s official records. The Department issued Christianson an order of suspension for his non-commercial driver’s license and order of disqualification for his commercial license (together referred to as suspension) based on his driving privileges being suspended in another jurisdiction. Section 39-06-33(2), N.D.C.C., states that, at a hearing regarding the suspension or revocation of a driver’s license, “the regularly kept records of the director may be introduced and are prima facie evidence of their content without further foundation.” The hearing file was certified by Glenn Jackson, Driver’s License Division Director, as a true copy of the official Department records. This Court concluded as a matter of law that Christianson rebutted the presumption that Jackson had authority to certify Department records. By establishing Jackson was on administrative leave when the certification was made, Christianson shifted the burden to the Department to either prove Jackson had certification authority or to proffer evidence authenticating the copies. The Department did neither, and therefore the hearing officer abused his discretion by admitting the file because its authenticity was not established. Because the Department relied on inadmissible evidence to suspend Christianson’s driving privileges, this Court found that the Department’s decision was not in accordance with the law. Therefore, this Court reversed the hearing officer’s decision to admit the hearing file and vacated the Department’s suspension and disqualification of Christianson’s driving privileges.
Kyle Christianson appeals from a district court’s judgment affirming the North Dakota Department of Transportation’s suspension of his driving privileges based on his conviction in Canada for a driving under the influence offense. Christianson argues that the Department lacked jurisdiction because the Canadian statute does not define an equivalent offense and that the hearing officer failed to provide a fair and impartial hearing. At the end of the hearing, the hearing officer recommended Christianson’s driving privileges be suspended. The Department adopted the recommendation and the district court affirmed. Christianson appealed that decision to this Court, and this Court reversed and vacated the judgment in April of 2020 because it was based on erroneously admitted evidence. Christianson v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2020 ND 76, 941 N.W.2d 529. Under North Dakota law, “[a] person may not drive or be in actual physical control of any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state if any of the following apply . . .” See N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(a-d). o support a suspension under N.D.C.C. § 39-06-27, a foreign statute need not be identical to the North Dakota statute; “the requirement is that the statutes be equivalent.” Walter v. N.D. State Highway Comm’r, 391 N.W.2d 155, 160 (N.D. 1986). This Court (1) concluded that the levels of impairment required under each offense are equivalent; (2) that the different presumptions presented here do not compel a determination that the statutes are not equivalent; (3) that the foreign statute must merely be equivalent to the North Dakota statute, and need not be identical; (4) that the Department had jurisdiction to suspend and disqualify Christianson’s non-commercial and commercial driving privileges; (5) that Christianson was provided a fair and impartial hearing; and (6) that the record’s silence on whether Christianson received due process in the Canadian proceedings does not preclude the Department from relying on the Canadian suspension to suspend and disqualify his driving privileges in North Dakota. As a result, this Court affirmed the Department’s suspension and disqualification of Christianson’s noncommercial and commercial driving privileges.
Fritz Opp appeals and the Department of Transportation cross-appeals from judgments affirming the Department’s decisions revoking Opp’s driving privileges for 180 days and reciprocally disqualifying him from operating a commercial motor vehicle for one year. Opp requested an administrative hearing on the Department’s intended revocation of his driving privileges under N.D.C.C. § 39–20–05 and a hearing on the reciprocal action against his commercial driver’s license under N.D.C.C. § 39–06.2–10.6. Under N.D.C.C. § 28–32–49, this Court reviewed the Department’s suspension or revocation of a driver’s license in the same manner as provided in N.D.C.C. § 28–32–46. Jangula v. N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 2016 ND 116, ¶ 5, 881 N.W.2d 639. This Court found that (1) Opp failed to file his notices of appeal with the court within seven days for either decision, and his appeals were untimely; and (2) that the district court erred in granting Opp an extension of time under N.D.R.Civ.P. 6(b) to file his notices of appeal and erred in not dismissing Opp’s appeals. Therefore, this Court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear Opp’s untimely appeals from the Department’s decisions, and thus, this Court reversed and remanded for the district court to enter judgments dismissing Opp’s appeals to the district court.
William Beaulieu appeals from a district court judgment reversing an administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) order awarding benefits and affirming prior Workforce Safety & Insurance (“WSI”) orders. In February 2014 Dr. Jane Stark conducted a commercial driver license (“CDL”) evaluation of Beaulieu, documenting that he was indefinitely unable to drive under the CDL requirements. In April 2014 Dr. Stark again saw Beaulieu and assigned him “a 50% permanent total disability. Section 65-05-12.2, N.D.C.C., provides the terms for WSI to determine a permanent impairment award when an injured employee’s compensable injury causes permanent impairment. “An injured employee is eligible for an evaluation of permanent impairment only when all conditions caused by the compensable injury have reached maximum medical improvement.” N.D.C.C. § 65-05-12.2(4). The ALJ’s order finding Beaulieu had a fifty percent permanent partial impairment rating was not in accordance with the law and not supported by the evidence. Therefore, this Court found that the ALJ erred in finding Beaulieu had a fifty percent permanent partial impairment rating. Consequently, this Court affirmed the finding that the ALJ erred in awarding permanent partial impairment and permanent total disability benefits.
Department of Transportation’s suspension of licensee’s noncommercial driving privileges following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) was a “conviction,” so as to support lifetime suspension of licensee’s commercial driving privileges after his second DUI conviction, although licensee had accepted the suspension of his driving privileges prior to dismissal of the DUI charge. The word “conviction” was defined, in part, as a determination that a person has violated or failed to comply with the law in an authorized administrative tribunal, and Department’s decision to suspend licensee’s driving privileges was a determination made by an authorized administrative tribunal. NDCC 39-06.2-02(8), 39-06.2-10(8).
Driver sought review of decision of the Department of Transportation (DOT) to suspend his driving privileges for two years for driving under the influence of alcohol. The District Court, Burleigh County, South Central Judicial District, Gail H. Hagerty, J., affirmed. Driver appealed. The Supreme Court, Maring, J., held that: [1] witnesses’ out-of-court statements regarding the time accident occurred were not admissible under present sense impression exception to hearsay, and [2] DOT’s failure to establish time of driving precluded suspension. Reversed and remanded.
Truck driver sought judicial review of decision of Department of Transportation (DOT) disqualifying truck driver’s commercial driver’s license for one year. The District Court, Grand Forks County, Northeast Central Judicial District, Harlan Patrick Weir, J., affirmed. Truck driver appealed. Holdings: The Supreme Court, Crothers, J., held that: [1] truck driver’s specification of error stating that DOT erroneously applied statutory chapter governing commercial driver’s licenses was minimally sufficient; [2] for purposes of statute requiring disqualification of commercial driver’s licenseholder due to first conviction of driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI), administrative suspension of truck driver’s noncommercial driving privileges following arrest for DUI was “conviction”; [3] statute requiring disqualification of commercial driver’s licenseholder from operating commercial motor vehicle for one year due to first DUI conviction was not void for vagueness; and [4] truck driver was not entitled to attorney fees. Affirmed.
Statute providing for lifetime suspension of commercial driving privileges if licensee suffers a second conviction for driving under the influence (DUI) while operating a noncommercial motor vehicle was not applied retroactively, by Department of Transportation, to a licensee, for purposes of state’s statutory presumption against retroactive application of legislation, though the licensee’s first DUI offense had occurred before effective date of lifetime suspension provision, where the triggering offense, i.e., the second DUI conviction, occurred after the provision’s effective date. NDCC 1-02-10, 39-06.2-10(8).
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